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Abstract
Withdrawal of  the Western security umbrella has problematised 
India's current development aid-led soft power approach in 
Afghanistan. As New Delhi debates its post-2014 policy options, 
this paper looks at the tensions that shape India's strategic thought 
in the region. The northwest frontier has traditionally defined 
India's territorial defence. In looking at historical debates regarding 
this region, this paper will highlight the impact of  India's territorial 
construct on its strategic outlook. The Bombay and Ludhiana 
Schools of  Indian Defence in the early nineteenth century 
respectively reflected advocacy of  a muscular forward and a 
diplomatic passive policy. They formed the basis for the dual-
layered buffer defence system called the 'ring fence'. Developed to 
defend the Raj from external and internal threats, this defence 
system steered the transformation of  frontiers into modern South 
Asian boundaries. India and Pakistan's inheritance of  these 
boundaries constructed by the Raj shape their strategic vision of  
the region. New Delhi's response to geopolitical developments 
such as the Soviet military intervention, rise of  the Taliban and the 
US military intervention post 9/11 are rooted in tensions 
emanating from its political geography. Striking a balance between 
Islamabad-Rawalpindi and Kabul and choosing between hard and 
soft power options form the basis of  India's Afghan dilemma.
Keywords: India, Afghanistan, Security and Foreign Policy, British Raj, 
political geography, strategy 
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Historic Sources of India's Contemporary Challenge
fghanistan has proved to be a security lynchpin in South and 
Central Asia over the last two decades. Home to a variety of  A
militant networks with regional and global links, Afghanistan's 
stability is crucial for the peaceful development of  the region. With the 
withdrawal of  US forces scheduled for 2014, there is tremendous anxiety 
among the neighbouring countries. Concerned about a spillover of  
violence and instability throughout the region, Afghanistan's neighbours 
are working hard to develop a regional mechanism to cope with the 
challenge. According to Washington, regional powers, particularly India 
and China, should play a proactive role in stabilising Afghanistan. Also 
of  much consequence will be the role of  Pakistan and Iran, both of  
whom stand at various odds with Kabul. Interestingly, both India and 
China, despite having supported the idea of  a regional solution, have 
been hedging their bets in Afghanistan. Both have refused to fill the 
security vacuum, and neither is increasing its aid and investment further 
than what has already been committed. For India, security concerns 
emanating from Afghanistan are even more immediate and large scale 
than those for China. Facing serious security challenges in Kashmir and 
having witnessed attacks on its soil by groups trained in the Afghan 
hinterlands, New Delhi is particularly concerned about the stability of  
Afghanistan. India's strategic-security community finds itself  at a policy 
crossroads as the salience of  these security issues increases. With the 
central theme being India's defence, the dilemma is rooted in developing 
mechanisms to achieve security within a certain structural and normative 
context. 
What policy choices does India have in Afghanistan post 2014? 
Buttressing its soft power approach with hard power will strain relations 
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Introduction
with Pakistan. Limited Indian engagement with Kabul, however, might 
increase Pakistan's political influence in Afghanistan. 
This paper will look at debates from the days of  the British Raj until now 
that have shaped India's strategic thought on Afghanistan. It will 
highlight the impact of  India's territorial construct on its strategic 
imagination and will argue that India's Afghan policy is determined by its 
political geography. 
An important theatre for India's security, the northwest frontier has 
traditionally defined India's territorial defence. Indeed, India's threat 
perception from China and strategic worth of  the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR) rose in significance primarily in late twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries; importance of  the northwestern frontier, however, has 
endured over centuries. With 1947 a watershed year, studies on South 
Asian geopolitics often focus more on the post-Independence era. The 
debate on India's frontier and defence policies, however, date back to the 
early nineteenth century. 
Steered by the Napoleonic Wars, the Bombay and Ludhiana Schools of  
Indian Defence emerged as the two competing lines of  thought 
1regarding India's defence.  The Bombay School advocated a forward 
military policy for defending India with River Oxus being the primary 
line of  defence. The Ludhiana School, on the other hand, advocated an 
economy-and diplomacy-driven policy with the River Indus being the 
outer bulwark. These schools transformed into the classic clash between 
the Forward School and the Closed Border School following the Indian 
revolt of  1857 and the Russian advance to Central Asia from 1860s 
onwards. These schools reflected opposition between ideas regarding 
the defence of  India. Debates over security and administrative 
arrangements were predominant during the British Raj. While Britain 
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feared invasion or coalition against itself  while it was only one state 
among many in Europe, the fulcrum of  the debates shifted towards its 
colonial enterprises when it became a paramount power in Asia with the 
defeat of  France. The Raj envisioned a dual-layered 'ring fence' defence 
2system for India.  Consisting of  an Inner Ring and an Outer Ring, this 
system of  defence sought to develop a 'series of  buffer zones along the 
3landward periphery of  the subcontinent'.  While the Inner Ring was 
made of  areas like Baluchistan, Northwest tribal areas and the Naga 
Hills, the Outer Ring consisted of  Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma. 
Stability in the region between the River Indus and the Hindu Kush, 
geographically divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is crucial for 
India's security and development. The Partition of  1947, though 
complicated, did not reduce the geopolitical imprint on India's strategic 
4choices.  There is a striking similarity between modern India's discourse 
on strategy and the earlier debates. These similarities reflect the tension 
over balancing relations between Islamabad and Kabul as well as opting 
between hard and soft approaches. The following sections will provide 
an overview of  the historical debates and their legacy in contemporary 
India. The first section will delve into the debate between the Bombay 
and the Ludhiana Schools. Though both schools had strong policy 
appeal, the Ludhiana School remained successful for most of  the first 
half  of  the nineteenth century. The second section of  this paper will 
discuss the debate over Nehru's visit to the Northwest Frontier 
Provinces (NWFP) in 1946 and its fallout. Discussion surrounding 
Nehru's NWFP visit reflects the strategic relevance of  this region and 
the impact of  political geography on strategy. The third section will 
focus on key dilemmas facing India during the Cold War period and 
afterwards. The last section provides the contours of  current policy 
challenges New Delhi faces with the withdrawal of  US combat troops 
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from Afghanistan in 2014. With swords crossed between passive and 
active policy proponents, the legacy of  nineteenth century debates 
continues. 
Expanding the Raj 
The quest for logical territorial limits of  the Indian Empire steered 
diplomatic, political and military activity of  the Raj in the nineteenth 
5century.  Reasons for this were as much related to defence from external 
threats as much as they were to exercising sovereign authority over a 
defined territory and people. The Durand Line Agreement of  1893 was a 
6step aimed at defining these territorial limits in the northwest regions.  
Where to draw the line and the nature of  Raj's relationship with 
7Afghanistan and Persia were hotly debated subjects.  From the time of  
the emergence of  Britain as a great power by 1818, these debates became 
increasingly intense over the years. With the defeat of  France following 
the Napoleonic Wars the fulcrum of  threat shifted from Europe to Asia. 
Concerns were that Russia would attempt to attack India rather than 
challenge British authority in Europe. Though the British navy provided 
ample protection to the British Isles, it could not afford to protect Asia. 
The defence of  India therefore required a substitute. Beginning in 
December 1829, the Great Game was played for the rest of  the century 
8precisely to develop this substitute.  There were two main questions 
facing Britain. Firstly, who poses the threat and of  what nature, and 
secondly, on what lines should the defence be structured? As the answer 
to the first question became relatively clear, seeking a definite answer to 
the second became increasingly complicated and formed the basis of  
debate. Not only was there a collision of  opposing philosophies, there 
was also a deep conflict of  interest within the British bureaucracy 
regarding the defence of  India. 
Securing Afghanistan
Emerging from the difference of  opinion between the Bombay and 
Ludhiana administrations, the two schools of  Indian defence debated 
throughout the 1820s and 1830s. The Bombay School stated that India 
could be best secured from a Russian advance with River Oxus being the 
primary line of  defence, and Afghanistan and Persia being British 
protectorates. The Ludhiana, and later Punjab, School(s), on the other 
hand, viewed the River Indus as the outer rampart for India's defence 
and relied more on diplomacy with the tsar to contain the Russian 
9advance (See Map 1).  Providing a blueprint for the debate between the 
Forward School (drawing from the Bombay School) and the Closed 
Border School (drawing from the Ludhiana School) that gained salience 
later in the nineteenth century, these advocacies played a critical role in 
shaping the Raj's frontier policies and evolving contemporary India's 
strategic framework. Moreover, adherence to these advocacy groups 
played a critical role in the making and breaking of  careers. With most of  
its impetus coming from a strong bureaucratic logic, the dynamism of  
these debates and the legacies they left withstood major structural 
overhauls. The following paragraphs will outline key features of  these 
debates.
www.orfonline.org6
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10 Map 1: British India and Persia in nineteenth century
The first round of  these debates started between the first Governor-
General of  India, Richard Wellesley, and the Secretary of  State for War, 
Henry Dundas, after the 1798 invasion of  Egypt by Napoleon 
11Bonaparte.  While the former wanted to ally with Persia against France, 
the latter advocated alliance with Afghanistan. Fear of  invasion of  
British India rose particularly after the Franco-Persian alliance following 
the treaty of  Finkenstein (1807). George Canning, the then Foreign 
Secretary, sided with Wellesley to challenge the threat from this Franco-
Persian alliance. The idea was to attract Persia towards Britain rather than 
to let it drift towards France. Dundas, however, bitterly contested an 
alliance with Persia. The result of  this clash was a unique British 
initiative, taken by Lord Minto, to send simultaneous missions to Persia, 
12Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind in 1808.  The idea was to cultivate the 
goodwill 'of  all states and countries to the east of  Indus, but also the 
Afghan government, and even the Tartar territories east of  the 
13Caspian.'  Further complicating the debate, however, was the issue of  
sending Christian missionaries to India, which involved a strong security 
angle. Most of  the actors who feared a French, or later Russian, invasion 
14were equally concerned about a rebellion by Indians.  Conversion to 
15Christianity, it was argued, would reduce such a threat.
Persia's decision to let Napoleon access the port of  Bandar Abbas 
16further heightened the threat of  invasion in 1808.  Of  the four missions 
mentioned above, John Malcolm headed the one to Persia. Malcolm, 
who would later become the Governor of  Bombay and the torchbearer 
of  the Bombay School, was given the job of  undercutting French 
influence in Persia. In case this Persian initiative failed, the British would 
try to develop an alliance with Afghanistan. Mountstuart Elphinstone 
would cultivate a relationship with the Afghan leadership, Shah Shuja at 
that time. An archrival of  Malcolm, Elphinstone became one of  the 
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leading advocates of  the Ludhiana School. Supporting Elphinstone in 
his advocacy was Charles Metcalfe, who led the mission to Lahore and 
later became the acting Governor-General of  India from 1835-1836. 
While Malcolm wanted an active economic and defence policy with 
Persia and expansion of  the British mission in Tehran, Elphinstone and 
17Metcalfe advocated the same with Kabul and Lahore.  
All four missions, however, ran into difficulties from the very beginning 
because of  rivalries between Punjab and Afghanistan. For instance, 
Elphinstone realised that a defensive or an offensive alliance with Kabul 
–against France and later Russia–meant antagonising Ranjit Singh, the 
strong ruler of  Punjab. An unfriendly Ranjit Singh could make any plans 
of  linking Persia with India impossible. 
Moreover, with the French influence in Persia still strong, Malcolm's 
efforts did not yield much fruit either. Finally, the missions to Persia and 
Lahore were deemed failures and Afghanistan was the only bulwark in 
18the region that agreed to ally in the defence of  India.  Unfortunately for 
the British, of  all the four states beyond the northwest frontier, Kabul 
was the weakest and the most difficult to handle politically. The four 
missions thus increased the risk of  a frontier war instead of  uniting the 
frontier states into a defensive coalition. Though the frontier war was 
still far away, the missions had already sparked a war within the British 
bureaucracy. Elphinstone and Metcalfe's leanings were towards the 
Ludhiana School; Lord Minto and Wellesley were to be the forerunners 
of  the Bombay School, and Malcolm its epitome. With one focusing on 
Persia and the other on Punjab, interestingly, both wanted to avoid 
fighting in Afghanistan. Apart from the geographical and climatic 
difficulties, relations with Kabul had jeopardised ties not only with 
Punjab, but with Persia too. 
ORF Occasional Paper
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As the first round of  the debate came to an end with the defeat of  
France, the second round began in 1829, this time with the Russians as 
potential aggressors. Arthur Wellesley, then Prime Minister of  Britain 
and the younger brother of  Richard Wellesley, and Lord Ellenborough, 
19President of  the Board of  Control, reinvigorated the debate.  It was to 
become the famous Great Game in Asia. Sharing the common concern 
of  a Russian invasion of  India in response to a British provocation in 
Europe, the question became one of  travel routes. Would the Russian 
advance come from the Caspian through Khiva and up the River Oxus, 
or from Georgia through Tehran and Herat? This issue had a strong 
political element to it as well as a military angle. Though the British were 
confident of  defeating a Russian army marching into India, they were 
20not sure whether this could be done quickly.  While a setback at the 
frontier would guarantee rebellion, the prospect of  invasion would 
21threaten one.  Correct assessment of  the route, thus, was very crucial.
Claude Wade, the Resident in Ludhiana in the 1820s and 1830s, and John 
Malcolm, now the Governor of  Bombay, spearheaded the debate in the 
1830s. Wade and his associates in the Ludhiana School expected a 
Russian advance from the Caspian through Khiva. Malcolm and his 
associates in the Bombay School expected Russia to take the route 
through Persia and Herat. The solutions offered by both these schools 
were based on their premises about the routes. The Ludhiana School 
proposed the stabilisation of  the northwest frontier. This could be done 
either by using armed intervention in Afghanistan or by preparing a 
strong defence at the Indus in alliance with the Sikhs. The Bombay 
School, on the other hand, sought deepening of  the Persian connection. 
A common point between the two schools was the acceptance of  
keeping the defence of  India separate from the balance of  power in 
Securing Afghanistan
22Europe.  It was clear that India's defence should not be tied to British 
power in Europe as this would reduce maneuvering space for London 
within the European continent. Under no circumstance was Britain's 
insular position as a group of  isles protected by a powerful navy to be 
given up for the defence of  India. Even though the British navy provided 
security for India's sea lanes of  trade and communication, the threat of  
invasion remained serious mostly through land. As a result, the point of  
contention boiled down to the choice of  allies.
Though the proponents of  these schools took turns in power and 
popularity, the Ludhiana School remained victorious for most of  the 
early nineteenth century. This was mostly because of  the turf  battle 
between John Malcolm and Harford Jones Brydges, the first Resident in 
Baghdad. Termed as 'Malcolmites' and 'Harfordians', the admirers of  
both these men fought tough battles to gain control of  the Persian 
mission. Despite being at their zenith between 1828 and 1830 and having 
run the Persian mission successfully for more than twenty-five years 
since its inception, the Malcolmites hit a dead end when a new 
23government was elected in 1830.  The departure of  Malcolm, Wellesley 
and Ellenborough was followed by the arrival of  hardcore adherents of  
the Ludhiana School–William Bentinck, the Governor-General of  Fort 
William, Charles Metcalfe, Bentinck's close associate and head of  the 
Lahore mission, and Henry Willock, former envoy to Persia who later 
became the chairman of  the East India Company. Almost immediately a 
policy of  restraint was adopted and the importance of  the Persian 
mission declined. Expecting an advance through Khiva, the Ludhiana 
School suggested developing Afghanistan as a buffer and forestalling 
any quarrels with Persia and Russia using tools of  diplomacy. This was 
also the phase when the debate over the tools of  diplomacy–economic 
or military–became more animated. Debate between the Ludhiana and 
ORF Occasional Paper
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Bombay Schools eventually shifted into a standoff  between the Punjab 
and Bombay Schools of  Indian defence in mid-and late-nineteenth 
24century.  Often termed as the Forward School and the Closed Border 
25School, these doctrines emerged after the 1860s.  
This time it was the Indian Revolt of  1857 and a renewed Russian 
advance in Central Asia that intensified the debate. Spearheading this 
phase of  the debate were John Lawrence, Viceroy and Governor-
General of  India from 1864-1869, and Henry C. Rawlinson, a senior 
26British Indian army officer.  While the former was a proponent of  the 
Closed Border School, the latter championed the Forward Policy. The 
Closed Border School advocated non-interference in the domestic 
Afghan affairs. The precondition was that Russia too should keep its 
hands off  Afghanistan. According to this school, only direct diplomacy 
between St. Petersburg and London could solve the problem. Moreover, 
in case of  war, Britain should fight Russia all over the world–particularly 
near the Mediterranean or the Black Sea–than restrict the war to the 
northwest frontier. Forward School opponents, however, derided this 
policy as 'masterly inactivity'. 
According to Rawlinson and his Forward School associates, the Russian 
advance could only be stemmed by building military outworks in Kabul 
and Kandahar. This would require the government of  India to get 
closely involved in domestic Afghan affairs. They also advocated signing 
of  a defensive and offensive alliance with Kabul and station a British 
agent in Afghanistan. Forward School strongly believed that the Russian 
War Ministry and local commanders were fairly independent in 
27determining the nature and extent of  Russian influence in Central Asia.  
In order to buttress the defences in Kabul and Kandahar, suggested 
Rawlinson, London could also capitalise on its presence in Persia. 
www.orfonline.org 11
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Creation of  a military nucleus of  5,000-10,000 Persian soldiers trained 
and sustained by Britain was proposed. Though this policy was never 
implemented, there was a strong constituency in its favour. Moreover, 
unlike the Closed Border School, the Forward School believed that 
Britain did not have enough resources to fight Russia all over the world. 
A Forward Policy, however, was to be dismissed as 'mischievous activity' 
28by its opponents.   
Ideological Impetus 
The core philosophies guiding these debates were Evangelical 
Reformism and Utilitarianism on one hand, and Conservative 
imperialism on the other. The Ludhiana or the Closed Border Schools 
drew from the Utilitarian and Evangelical Reform traditions of  British 
politics. The Bombay School or Forward Policy doctrine attracted its 
proponents from among the romantic, Conservative imperialists. While 
the Conservatives were votaries of  civil liberties, the Evangelicals and 
29Utilitarians vouched for 'equal opportunity of  salvation' and self-help.  
The debate between Dundas and Wellesley after Napoleon's invasion of  
Egypt in 1798 also had strong undertones of  these guidelines. Although 
both schools ended up annexing just as much territory as the other, the 
30Reformists abhorred use of  force and believed in persuasion.  
Conversely, Conservatives advocated annexing territory and resorted to 
31force without much ethical dilemma.  
In a bid to make the Indus the external frontier of  India and keep the 
Russians at bay, a Conservative Ellenborough proposed trade with 
Central Asia through the Indus in 1830. It was to be supported by 
military means and carried out by steamers. Ellenborough's policy was 
clear that British goods were to be given diplomatic, and when needed, 
ORF Occasional Paper
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military protection in the frontier region. Countering this view with 
reformist and utilitarian ideals was Charles Grant, Ellenborough's 
successor at the Board of  Control in 1831. According to Grant, shifting 
the frontiers to the Indus was not required, as the Sikh kingdom and 
amirs of  Sind could be motivated to both defend India and provide a 
stable northwest frontier. Moreover, Grant was of  the view that as soon 
as 'privilege and superstition were done away, the two most serious 
obstacles to the safety of  British India i.e. rebellion and bankruptcy, 
32would be overcome.'  Utilitarians believed that there was no need of  
excessive political influence or the deployment of  the army with the 
steamers on the Indus. Both schools banked upon trade and stable 
frontiers to win the Great Game, but in divergent ways. The 
Conservative vision was to turn Punjab and Sind into protectorates and 
have a chain of  political buffer states separating the European and 
Indian political systems. The Evangelical Reformist vision supported by 
Utilitarianism expected trade to do the same.
The debates mentioned above were subject to external shocks 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These ranged 
from internal turbulence either in Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind, to the 
Russian advance across Central Asia after the Crimean War (1853-
331856).  Russia annexed Tashkent and Bukhara in 1866, Khiva in 1873, 
and Merv in 1884, making its boundaries coterminous with 
34Afghanistan.  Even though British influence over Afghanistan was 
uncontested and the 1873 Anglo-Russian Agreement recognised it, the 
threat from Russia would haunt the British till the very end of  the Raj. 
Adding to the insecurities was the Indian Revolt of  1857 that played an 
important role in providing space to the advocates of  Forward Policy. 
Not surprisingly, Britain hammered out various treaties with different 
rulers of  Afghanistan between 1855 and 1921 that included the crucial 
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Durand Line Agreement of  1893. It also annexed chunks of  Afghan 
territory including the Khyber Pass as well as rights to conduct the 
35foreign affairs of  Kabul.  The Raj's Forward Policy was to be further 
reflected in its leasing of  the Bolan Pass on a permanent basis in 1883 
from the Khan of  Kalat and declaration of  some parts of  Balochistan as 
British territory in 1887. These conquests unleashed dynamics that 
would define modern India's political geography.  
Political Geography: 'Ring Fence' and the Frontiers
The above-mentioned conquests contributed towards evolution of  
36frontiers into boundaries.  The Durand Line Agreement made it clear 
that with the advent of  the Forward School, there was little scope for a 
politically neutral territory. This transformation led to the development 
of  the 'ring fence' concept according to which India would have a dual-
layered defence system i.e. the Inner Ring and the Outer Ring. The idea 
was to develop a series of  buffer zones along the northwestern periphery 
of  India. The territorial construct of  India thus came to consist of  three 
kinds of  frontiers: the administered frontier, the non-administered 
37frontier, and the external frontiers.  Forming India's Centre was the 
administered frontier with defined bureaucratic mechanisms and linear 
boundaries. Beyond the frontiers of  administration were internal non-
administered frontiers–Inner Ring–that included the NWFP, 
Baluchistan, Kashmir, Nepal, and the Naga Hills. Though the writ of  the 
state and its bureaucracy hardly ever ran in this area, claims of  
sovereignty were often made using military force. As an inheritor of  
these frontiers after 1947, the Government of  independent India and 
Pakistan claimed sovereign rights over them. The third kind was the 
frontier of  influence i.e. Outer Ring. Lacking in geographic definition 
but of  high diplomatic concern and lying beyond the frontiers of  
ORF Occasional Paper
www.orfonline.org14
administration and non-administered areas, these included places like 
Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet, Burma, Sinkiang, and Siam. The idea was to 
exert influence in these areas to keep other great powers at bay. The 
states in this outer circle, according to Brobst, were treated as 
38protectorates.  
This dual-layered territorial defence system formed the backbone of  
both colonial and independent India's regional strategic outlook. For 
example, even though London asked Calcutta not to annex more 
territory, foreign policies of  the Raj 'expressed needs and interests 
39rooted in the subcontinent'.  This was partly also because of  the 
determination to keep the defence of  India independent of  the balance 
of  power in Europe. Independent India inherited this territorial 
construct and the problems associated with the same. With the political 
geography established, future debates on India's defence would happen 
within this ambit. Though the impact of  British bureaucratic and 
strategic culture on modern Indian thought is hotly debated, it has been 
difficult for most Indian planners to overlook the geographic realities of  
South Asia. The one time the foreign and security policies of  the Raj 
were challenged was by Jawaharlal Nehru just before Independence, only 
40to be reset by the new Pakistani political leadership.  
Nehru and the Frontier
The Partition of  1947 challenged the dual-layered defence strategy. 
Cutting right through the middle of  what is considered India's Centre, 
the Partition created a deep rupture in the innermost administrative 
frontier of  the Raj. Not surprisingly, Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, 
now dominated the minds of  Indian strategists. However, if  the British 
Raj played an important role in articulating a strategic vision for India, 
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the debate on the NWFP right before Independence set the tone for 
India's vision of  the region. Mostly about whether Nehru should visit 
the NWFP in October 1946 or not, the debate took place primarily 
between Nehru, Governor of  the NWFP Olaf  Caroe, and British Field 
Marshall Viscount Wavell. More than the details of  the events that 
unfolded during and after the visit, of  importance is the political 
structure within which the visit and the debate took place. Partition was 
still ten months away and Nehru had just been given the portfolio of  the 
Vice-President of  the Executive Council, External Affairs and 
Commonwealth Relations, under the interim government, in September 
1946. In essence, even though everything indicated a partition, this was a 
unique period in which an Indian nationalist governed a united India. 
There are as many versions of  Nehru's visit and its fallout as there were 
actors involved. Events unfolded somewhat like this–Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan invited Nehru to the NWFP in September 1946, after the election 
of  the latter as the head of  the interim government of  India in the same 
41month.  The invitation came in the backdrop of  increased communal 
violence across the subcontinent and victory of  the Congress in the 
recently held provincial elections in the NWFP. Moreover, as relations 
between the All India Muslim League (AIML) and the Indian National 
Congress (INC) became increasingly tense, the visit had the potential to 
unleash serious political violence. Sensing trouble, Caroe and Wavell 
strongly advised Nehru to refrain from accepting the invitation. Senior 
Congress leaders including Gandhi, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and 
Maulana Azad too discouraged Nehru from visiting the Frontier. This, 
however, was not to happen and Nehru landed in Peshawar on 16 
October 1946. The following incidents would prove that the visit was 
indeed problematic. Apart from the warmth showered by Ghaffar 
Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars (KK), Nehru's presence solicited major 
ORF Occasional Paper
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protests. Along with public protests by AIML cadres, and an angry 
reception by the maliks of  various tribal agencies including Waziristan 
and Malakand, Nehru had to face stone pelting and blockades. Losing his 
temper at one point and calling the maliks of  Waziristan 'petty 
42pensioners', Nehru's public posturing further worsened the situation.  
The end results were clear–Nehru apparently made up his mind that the 
43NWFP was a lost cause.
Of  interest here are the tensions that marked the visit and the fallout of  
the same on policy perceptions. First was the clash between Indian 
nationalists' thought process with that of  the Raj. Imagined as a frontier 
of  the Raj, the tribal areas of  the NWFP were to provide a protective 
buffer not only from Russians, French, Persians and Afghans, but also 
44from internal insecurities.  Caroe, the foremost proponent of  Forward 
Policy, had never allowed any party politician to build a mass base in the 
frontier agencies. The British advocacy in the NWFP entailed a complete 
disconnect between the mountainous tribal belts of  the NWFP and the 
45settled areas.  Therefore, even the KK movement was restricted to 
Peshawar and other districts in the settled areas. Governor Caroe, in 
typical divide-and-rule fashion, had barred even the newly elected Prime 
Minister of  the NWFP, Khan Sahib, from entering Waziristan and 
Malakand. From his side, Caroe used Political Agents (PA, directly 
reporting to him) to maintain contact with the maliks and mullahs of  the 
tribal areas. Even though there was discontent among some tribal elders 
over this British policy, dissent was kept under check using cash, 
weapons, internecine tribal rivalry, and the rhetoric of  Islam. Party 
politics had the potential to undermine this setup by undercutting British 
influence over tribal leaders. Nehru's visit with Ghaffar Khan as his host 
was to challenge this basic tenet of  British Frontier Policy. 
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A classic exchange of  letters between Caroe, Wavell and Nehru after the 
visit highlights the depth of  the issue. In a letter to Wavell, Caroe made 
no bones that Nehru should not have visited on party lines, and more so, 
46not with a Frontier leader by his side.  He conceded that he had advised 
Nehru that "….a party approach to the tribal problem was bound to 
fail….if  he had gone round by himself  quietly and without losing his 
temper…he would have been politely received….it was fatal to take a 
47party politician like Abdul Ghaffar Khan…"
Practicing Forward Policy at its best, Caroe played an active role in 
48influencing tribal leaders to reject Nehru's political overtures.  
Challenging this Frontier Policy was Nehru's take on the situation in the 
NWFP. In a letter to Caroe he made it clear that if  it were to happen, the 
NWFP would be fully integrated into the Indian political and economic 
system. The policy of  isolating the region was not acceptable. 
Emphasising on land routes between India and Afghanistan, and a 
brewing class conflict in the tribal agencies, Nehru expressed the need to 
reverse the Frontier Policy from 'controlled isolation' to 'complete 
reintegration'. Charging British authorities with exacerbating class 
conflict in the NWFP by issuing subsidies to the maliks and mullahs, 
Nehru sought a definite end to it. Though he appreciated the risks 
involved with such opening up after centuries of  isolation, he stated 
categorically that "….It seems essential to me that the barriers which had 
been erected around the Tribal areas preventing free movements should 
be largely done away with. People from the Frontier Province should be 
allowed to go there and people from the Tribal Areas should be allowed 
49to come to the Frontier Province."
The second point of  tension was between Pashtun nationalism and 
Islam. The idea of  'Pashtunistan' took shape immediately after Nehru's 
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visit and the impending referendum on opting between India and 
Pakistan. Having been left by the Congress to fend for himself, Ghaffar 
Khan sought a plebiscite between Pakistan and Pashtunistan. However, 
with AIML workers actively courting tribal maliks in the name of  Islam, 
Ghaffar Khan was becoming increasingly marginalised. Adding to the 
woes of  the KK was Britain's ready acceptance of  the AIML's political 
presence over that of  the KK. Though non-violent in nature, the KK 
50was a cadre-based movement also known as the Red Shirts.  Viewing the 
army-style, disciplined Red Shirt volunteers as potential storm-troopers, 
51Caroe was outspokenly averse to KK activism.  Moreover, the idea of  an 
independent Pashtunistan ran against every tenet of  British frontier 
policy as well as the interests of  the newly emerging Pakistani elite. From 
a strategic perspective, the creation of  Pashtunistan would have posed a 
serious threat to Pakistan on its western border. With relations between 
AIML leadership, later Islamabad, and Kabul at an all time low, the 
concept of  Pashtunistan was anathema. Interestingly, India was silent on 
this aspect. 
The above tensions had multiple impacts on modern India's strategic 
framework. Firstly, the geographical rupture between India and 
Afghanistan led to a decline in the latter's strategic immediacy to New 
Delhi. Viewing Kabul mostly in conjunction with Pakistan, policy 
interaction between independent India and Kabul occurred while 
52keeping Islamabad-Rawalpindi in sight.  Marked by cautiousness, 
India's Afghan policy was rooted in security concerns emanating from 
the Pashtun hinterlands of  South and East Afghanistan. Pakistan's use 
of  Pashtun tribal fighters from the NWFP and Afghanistan in the 1948 
war over Kashmir raised New Delhi's concerns of  Pakistani influence in 
the Afghan hinterlands. Secondly, India maintained a studied silence on 
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Islamabad's claims over the Durand Line. Having inherited the frontiers 
of  the Raj, India was to claim these hypothetical lines as legitimate 
international borders with China. Undermining Pakistani claims on the 
Durand Line would jeopardise its own position vis-à-vis China. Thirdly, 
the discourse on the importance of  trade routes between India and 
Afghanistan, as Nehru articulated, became policy pronouncements and 
long-term interests. And finally, as claimed by Embree, 'concern for the 
inviolability of  frontiers that has been of  such importance to 
contemporary India is one aspect of  the nineteenth-century 
53inheritance'.
Inheriting the Raj's Legacy 
The legacy of  the above debates persisted even after the Partition of  
1947. This is reflected most in the strategic choices facing New Delhi 
post-Independence. On one hand, it wanted to develop good 
neighbourly relations with Pakistan; on the other, it wanted to undercut 
Pakistani military's influence in Afghanistan. A new nation with high 
sensitivity towards its territorial inheritance, India thus faced security 
challenges similar to that of  the Raj. Three indicators are particularly 
important in this respect. Firstly, debate over the construct of  India's 
Centre. Various lucid and detailed accounts exist about the debates 
surrounding the consolidation of  the Indian Union before 
Independence. Political diplomacy undertaken by Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel and Nehru, with support from Lord Mountbatten, to build the 
Indian nation state-by-state and province-by-province is well 
54documented.  Constructing the geographical contours of  
contemporary India using political and military tools was a critical part 
of  consolidating India's Centre. Even though Nehru lost hope over the 
NWFP after his 1946 visit, the discourse surrounding the event was 
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crucial. Political debates that led to the formation of  India were the first 
step towards claiming sovereignty over most of  India's Centre as 
envisioned by the Raj. 
Secondly, India and Pakistan's assertion that the outer limits of  the Inner 
Ring are their international borders. Inheritance of  the frontiers 
constructed by the Raj proved problematic. It contributed to almost 
every security concern emanating in the region post 1947. Both India 
and Pakistan have had difficulty exercising sovereign control over 
regions lying within the Inner Ring. Islamabad's woes in the FATA 
region and India's security problems in the North East are live examples 
of  this. While India has attempted to integrate these regions into the 
administered frontiers by extending the writ of  the state, Pakistan 
continued with the Raj legacy. The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of  
1901, for instance, introduced by the British to maintain control over the 
Pashtun areas of  Pakistan, still remains in place. Furthermore, Pakistan's 
boundary dispute with Afghanistan and New Delhi's rivalry with Beijing 
over Arunachal Pradesh are testaments to problems associated with the 
continuation of  borders set by the British Raj. Thirdly, a critical point 
whose adequate appreciation is beyond the ambit of  this paper, is the 
deep impact of  British bureaucratic institutions on India's strategic 
55thought.   
Despite the moralpolitik and nonalignment advocated at the global stage, 
Nehru's regional policies were modern translations of  the Inner Ring 
concept. The dichotomy was most reflected in the first four treaties India 
signed with Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Afghanistan. While the first three 
reinforced the Bombay School's doctrine of  Forward Policy in the 
frontier, the one with Afghanistan shifted gears reflecting tenets of  the 
Ludhiana School. For instance, the Peace and Friendship treaties, signed 
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with Bhutan and Nepal in 1949 and 1950 respectively, were similar to the 
Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of  Sinchula (1865) and the Nepal-Britain 
Mutual Treaty (1923). Even the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of  1950 drew 
upon the patron-client equations laid out by the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty 
of  1861. All these Himalayan kingdoms more or less became 
protectorates of  India, with their foreign and defence policies being 
influenced by New Delhi. The Treaty of  Peace and Friendship with 
Afghanistan (1950), however, was simply a confirmation of  India's 
continued interest in its extended neighbourhood. Nehru did not seek 
influence over Kabul's foreign policy as sought by most proponents of  
the Bombay School nor did he continue the supply of  arms to the 
Afghan army, as was planned according to an agreement in 1945. At the 
heart of  this contradiction was the division of  the subcontinent, which 
shifted the odds in favour of  tenets advocated by the Ludhiana School. 
Lack of  contiguous borders with Afghanistan and a tense relationship 
with Pakistan challenged the logic of  coercive diplomacy with Kabul. A 
forward diplomatic approach with Afghanistan became the domain of  
Islamabad instead of  New Delhi.
Diplomatic arrangements between New Delhi and Kabul could have 
been different if  the Partition had not have happened. Case in point was 
India's tacit adoption of  the Treaty of  Rawalpindi (1919) in which the 
Afghan leadership accepted the Durand Line as a boundary between 
Afghanistan and British India. Strategically favouring Pakistan, the logic 
was to seek legitimacy for India's own territorial assertions with China. 
As a result, India's stand on the Pashtunistan issue too has been in 
continuation of  the Raj. Nehru was against the idea and articulated so on 
many occasions. Moreover, not only did he reject a military pact with 
Kabul, he also discontinued the supply of  weapons to the Afghan army 
at subsidised rates based on a 1945 agreement. Training of  Afghan 
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officers on Indian soil, however, was permitted. Closely connected to the 
increasing turbulence in the Pashtun hinterlands of  Afghanistan, 
Nehru's decision to cut down military aid had a strong resonance with 
the Ludhiana School's advocacy of  practicing restraint. Added to this 
was the utilitarian tenet of  using economic tools to promote security and 
stability. The External Affairs Division (EAD) agreed to increase 
economic assistance to Afghanistan in 1950. Given a group of  Indian 
National Congress members representing the British Indian 
government in 1937 already having established a trading agency in 
56Kabul, economic cooperation was easy to implement.  
The 1979 Soviet military intervention complicated India's options in 
Afghanistan. Friendship with the Soviet Union became an important 
factor, particularly with the rise of  the Islamabad-Washington-Beijing 
nexus. One strand was totally opposed to the intervention and stated it in 
just as many words. Leading a Janata Party government in 1979 when the 
Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan was Charan Singh. Quick to assert 
India's reservation of  military intervention in its neighbourhood and 
aversion to undermining the sovereignty of  Afghanistan, Charan Singh 
57made India's stand fairly clear.  Supported by key right-wing leaders 
including Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Charan Singh reflected the basic political 
instinct that India had inherited from the Raj–that of  territorial 
sensitivity towards a region that India considers to be its zone of  
58influence.  This was the first time the traditional nineteenth century 
threat of  a Russian invasion of  Afghanistan actually materialised. The 
strategic buffer had been violated. Not surprisingly, Pakistan's reaction 
was even worse, leading to its spearheading what became one of  world's 
largest covert campaigns against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Indira 
Gandhi soon replaced Charan Singh, and she too was personally against 
59the intervention.  The public stand, nonetheless, was supportive of  
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Moscow. The decision led to fallout within India's foreign policy 
60bureaucracy.  
Of  essence here is the way in which New Delhi dealt with the dilemma. 
Despite the support to the Soviets, Gandhi sent a special emissary to 
Pakistan in order to assure President General Zia-ul-Haq that he could 
'could remove as many divisions as he wished from the Indian border 
without fear of  any advantage being taken by India and suggested talks 
61on reduction of  force levels'.  Not only was this an attempt to develop 
communication mechanisms with Islamabad but also a way to restrict 
Pakistan from altering the regional balance of  power. Washington had 
promised a regular supply of  sophisticated weapons and large amounts 
of  money to Islamabad in wake of  the Soviet-Afghan war. Then Foreign 
Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Pakistan in June 1981 occurred in 
this context. Rao made it clear to his Pakistani audience that India was 
'unequivocally committed to respect Pakistan's national unity, territorial 
integrity, and sovereign equality' and its right to obtain arms for self-
62defense.  As a result, the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission was formed 
in 1982 to facilitate trade and commerce, General Zia visited Delhi on 1 
November 1982, and talks to establish the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) were initiated. Instead of  Forward 
Policy, New Delhi was engaging Pakistan as per the tenets of  the 
Ludhiana School.  
Contemporary Policy Challenges
Debates over the Afghan question during the 1990s civil war, and 
particularly after 9/11, interestingly, are much more reflective of  
nineteenth-century debates. Having emerged as a confident power with 
a strong economy and modern military, India must decide how far it can 
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go in terms of  using hard power options in Afghanistan. This debate is 
particularly critical given the immediacy of  security challenges from the 
northwestern frontier and the asymmetric nature of  threats. A sole focus 
on soft power options became problematic for India given Pakistan's 
recourse to asymmetric warfare techniques. In what is seen as a shift 
towards the Forward School, India provided financial and logistical 
63support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance from 1996 till 2001.  
Throughout this period India's strategic community was divided 
between proponents of  Forward and Closed Border School. Just like 
Metcalfe, Bentinck, and Willock advocated steamers with British Indian 
goods across the Indus and into Afghanistan and Central Asia, one 
strand of  the strategic community advocates overland trade links 
between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics 
(CARs). And similar to Malcolm, Ellenborough and Wellesley's 
advocacy of  military boots and hard power, the other strand advocates 
increased training and equipping of  the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF); committed support to non-Pashtun groups to counter a 
reversal of  the Taliban; honing relations with Pashtuns to undercut 
Pakistan's influence; and finally, in hushed tones, supporting armed non-
64state actors in Afghanistan against Pakistan.  The difference between 
conservatives of  the nineteenth and the twenty-first century is that while 
the former developed myths about the greatness and righteousness of  
Britain, the latter hold similar myths about India as a strong power. 
Unlike with the Soviets, there was no resistance to the US-led North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) intervention in 2001. In fact, India viewed it as a 
65much-needed intervention and offered its air bases to ISAF aircrafts.  
Not only did the NATO-ISAF presence in Afghanistan allow India to 
reestablish official contacts with Kabul, it undercut Pakistan's looming 
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presence on the Afghan political landscape established during the 
Taliban years. After six long years of  diplomatic absence in Kabul, India 
realised that non-engagement, including with the Afghan Taliban, was 
not really an option. Former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh was the first 
to break the taboo of  talking to the Taliban. During his visit to Kandahar 
during the IC814 hijack crisis in December 1999, he expected an opening 
66with the Pashtuns.  This met with antipathy from not only Pakistan but 
67also from the foreign affairs bureaucracy in New Delhi.  However, as 
India's thinking on Afghanistan developed over time, the first thing it did 
after reopening its embassy in Kabul was to engage with the Pashtuns. 
For India, this was the only way to increase its presence in the troubled 
Pashtun hinterlands of  Afghanistan. India adopted a comprehensive 
developmental partnership with Kabul and committed about US$ 2 
billion as development and reconstruction aid over the years. Most small 
development projects that India undertook were focused in the Pashtun-
dominated south and east Afghanistan. Moreover, similar to the 
approach Nehru adopted in 1950s, India also agreed to train Afghan 
army officers, but only on Indian soil. New Delhi ruled out hard military 
presence in Afghanistan and signed the India-Afghanistan Strategic 
Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2011. 
The SPA 2011 faced its first challenge with the request of  arms transfer 
to Kabul by Afghan President Hamid Karzai in May 2013. The demand 
came at a time of  increased tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
intensifying New Delhi's security dilemma. Complicating this context is 
the expected removal of  the US-led security umbrella post 2014 and the 
entry of  Chinese investments into a war-torn Afghanistan. Despite its 
alleged economic rivalry with Beijing and unsolved border disputes, 
India and China organised a counter-terrorism dialogue on 
68Afghanistan.  Joint mechanisms by the Asian giants could help bring 
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stability in Afghanistan over the long run. However, the question of  
accommodating Pakistani sensitivities post 2014 is problematic. With 
India's national security closely linked to the ground situation in 
Afghanistan, the nature of  Pakistan's involvement remains crucial. 
Pakistan's overarching presence in India's debate over the Afghan 
question challenges the very fundamentals of  India's strategic vision of  
the subcontinent. 
Conclusion
Does India plan its security using a Forward Policy approach by arming 
Kabul, or a passive policy approach by discussing the Afghan question 
with Pakistan? According to Gurmeet Kanwal, a former Indian Army 
officer and strategic expert, India should send its troops to Afghanistan 
69'if  invited'.  Kanwal is a strong advocate of  Indian military presence in 
Afghanistan under the UN peacekeeping umbrella, if  not on its own. 
Going one step further is Sushant Singh, security commentator, 
suggesting 'shifting the battleground' to Afghanistan rather than fighting 
70the Pakistani army on its Eastern front.  According to Harsh Pant, an 
Indian foreign policy expert, 'New Delhi will have to prepare itself  for 
making some tough choices in the coming days. The days of  merely 
71relying on 'soft power' in Afghanistan are well past their sell by date'.  
Even though there is less antipathy towards talking to the Taliban today, 
there exists a strong constituency within India's foreign policy 
72bureaucracy that advocates supporting non-Pashtuns.  Further 
reflecting the tenets of  Forward School are Indian army officials 
associated with Afghanistan. According to a senior retired Indian Army 
official, India needs to have a proactive Afghan policy and 'should not 
73shy away from supporting Afghans in the security sphere'.  
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The clash between proponents of  Forward and Passive policy 
proponents over Afghanistan and Pakistan has intensified during the 
course of  the last decade of  war in Afghanistan. The counter-narrative 
to the Forward School of  thought remains that India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan should solve the Durand Line and Kashmir disputes 
diplomatically. Moreover, focusing on the economic angle, there is a 
strong lobby that advocates trade overland routes between India and 
Afghanistan. Similar to what the Ludhiana School proposed, the idea is 
that connecting the subcontinent through trade and commerce will 
reduce security threats. According to C. Raja Mohan, India's top strategic 
analyst, India should work towards Pakistan's borders in both east and 
west. Promoting legitimisation of  the Durand Line, Raja Mohan 
74presents a case with strong tenets of  the Closed Border School.  From 
this perspective, securing Pakistan's boundaries will decrease pressure on 
the Pakistani state. While supported by many, India's policy overtures 
over the last decade have been marked by caution. Despite a strong 
forward policy constituency, the political leadership has refrained from 
engaging in the same. As best stated by Gautam Mukhopadhaya, India's 
ambassador to Afghanistan (2010-2013), 'we (India) are trying to expand 
75the neutral space in Afghanistan rather than taking sides'.  For advocates 
of  a cautious policy, focus on neutrality and economic link remains key. 
Nonetheless, dynamics between advocacies are often contingent on the 
way Pakistan reacts to the situation in Afghanistan.  
Despite the Partition, the imprint of  geography on strategic choices 
made by India is visible. Split over choosing between hard and soft power 
approach in Afghanistan, India is dealing with dilemmas similar to those 
during the Raj. Policy advocacy of  the Bombay and the Ludhiana 
Schools is resonant in choices India faces in Afghanistan today. Despite a 
cautious policy in practice, there is strong resonance of  adopting a 
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muscular approach. Calling for a coercive but pragmatic foreign policy, 
Jaswant Singh has been recognised as having 'Curzonian ambitions' for 
76India.  Moreover, Mani Dixit, considered Curzon 'among the greatest 
77of  the Indian nationalists.'  Attraction towards the Bombay School is 
reflected in India's policy towards the CARs. In 2002, under the 
stewardship of  Jaswant Singh, India opened its first air base in Ayni, 
Tajikistan despite the fact that it was already operating from the Farkhor 
Air Base in the country since 1996. Though the Manmohan Singh 
government decided to continue with these forward air force bases, it 
was combined with diplomatic initiatives to assuage concerns in 
neighbouring capitals.
In many ways, the Manmohan Singh government faces a challenge 
similar to that of  Wellesley and Dundas in 1808. Then the issue was to 
defend India from Napoleon's wrath by balancing between Persia, 
Punjab and Afghanistan. Not much different is New Delhi's diplomatic 
trapeze act to balance Islamabad-Rawalpindi and Kabul. The difference 
between then and now, however, is UPA's conscientious efforts to make 
India's neighbouring countries feel secure about its intentions, done 
mostly by non-interference in domestic political affairs and promotion 
of  trade links–much like the Ludhiana School. An arms commitment to 
Kabul would reflect a shift in gear towards forward policy. India's 
contemporary strategic choices in Afghanistan very much reflect 
tensions rooted in its territorial construct inherited from the Raj. 
*********************
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